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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
STATE OF UTAH, 
In the interest of 
Terry G., a person 
under 18 years of age. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from an order terminating 
the parental rights of Hilda Gullett, appellant, to her 
minor son, Terry Gullett, pursuant to Section 55—10— 
109 UCA 1953, as amended, in the District Juvenile 
Court For Cache County, State of Utah, before the 
Honorable Charles E. Bradford, Juvenile Court Judge. 
RELIEF SOUGHT 
Appellant seeks the reversal of the order and 
the dismissal of the petition to terminate the natural 
mother's parental rights or, in the alternative, a 
remand to the lower court for a new trial. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Appellant is the natural mother of Terry 
Gullett, a minor male born May 28, 1971, who has 
oase iNo. 10160 
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resided continuously with the appellant until April 27, 
1973, when a incident occurred which precipitated this 
case. On the day in question, the appellant asked 
Patty Creger, a 14—year—old girl who had previously 
babysat for her, to tend Terry at the appellant's home. 
Miss Creger agreed and both she and the appellant 
attempted to contact her mother to inform her of Miss 
Creger's whereabouts (p. 73). As Miss Creger's 
mother was not home, they proceeded to the ap-
pellant's home, where Miss Creger and the child \KSS 
left. A short time later, using a neighbor's phone, Miss 
Creger called her mother to tell he where she was (p. 
74). Her mother advised Patty that she was not to 
babysit at appellant's home and that she was to 
abandon the child which Miss Creger refused to do (pp. 
74& 84). Miss Creger's mother called Mr. Morgan, a 
social worker for the Division of Family Services in 
Cache County, who told Miss Creger to call the police 
which she refused (p. 75). A short time later, a friend 
of Miss Creger arrived and together they called the 
police who arrived a short time later and took the child 
with the babysitter to a shelter home. 
The appellant upon returning home later that 
evening found that Terry had been removed from the 
home and, after contacting Miss Creger's mother and 
the police was informed that her child was being held 
in shelter care. 
A petition was then filed by the Division of Family 
Services in Juvenile Court seeking to terminate the 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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appellant's parental rights to the said Terry Gullett 
upon four grounds, to—wit: (1) she had not acquired 
the necessary skills to properly supervise and train 
said child; (2) her housekeeping standards were so 
poor as to seriously jeopardize said child's physical and 
emotional health; (3) her moral standards were so low 
as to be a serious and damaging influence upon the 
morals and welfare of said child; and (4) she had left 
said child unattended or improperly attended. 
A trial was held on June 18 and 19,1973, at which 
time, the Juvenile Court Judge entered an order 
terminating the parental rights of the appellant to the 
child finding the first three allegations to be true and 
the fourth not true (p. 315). The court did not recite 
the specific testimony or facts upon which he found 
these allegations to be true but stated that even 
though finding these allegations to be true this did not 
necessarily require the appellant's parental rights be 
terminated (p. 315). He then ordered the termination 
because appellant had not shown a change from the 
conditions which caused her other children to be taken 
from her and, therefore, ruled there was no reasonable 
prospects that Terry's future would be brighter than 
the rest of the family's, and ordered the child to be 
placed for adoption(p. 321). After the conclusion of the 
hearing and after the attornies representing the State 
and the child,* appellant had left the Court room, the 
Judge reconsidered the order based on the extreme 
emotional condition of the appellant m& withdrew the 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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order and continued the matter for further disposition 
in six months with the appellant given specific 
requirements and conditions to be met prior to and 
during Terry's return to her summarized as follows: 
(p. 327). 
(1) All other persons living either permanently or 
temporarily at the home were to leave. 
(2) She was not to entertain men under inap-
propriate circumstances such as sleeping with her or 
engage in any kind of sexual activity at any time Terry 
was there. 
(3) She was to live a good moral life as established 
by Utah law and community standards. 
(4) She was not to maintain any condition or 
situation in the apartment that could be physically, 
morally or emotionally hazardous to Terry. 
(5) She was to keep the apartment reasonably 
clean and tidy. 
(6) When Terry was returned, she was to spend 
as much time as possible with him and when gone, she 
is to use a competent babysitter preferably in the 
family home. 
During this period, custody of Terry was to 
remain with Division of Family Services even when 
Terry was returned to the appellant. The Division of 
Family Services was ordered to provide all appropriate 
support services that may be indicated for Mrs. 
Gullett and give her every opportunity to learn good 
housekeeping practices, good parental practices, not 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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to the extent of overriding her, but to provide what 
she might need to assist her in making the changes in 
her life that would be necessary for her to justify 
A second hearing was held on January 25, 1974, at 
which time the Division of Family Services 
acknowledgedit had done nothing to assist appellant 
to meet the conditions as set forth by the Court (p. 
397) and expressed hostility and prejudice towards the 
appellant and her attorney for the change in the order 
which they thought was obtained by unethical conduct 
by the appellant's attorney, (p. 388—89). 
The Court found that the appellant had made 
some superficial changes in her habits and lifestyle but 
had shown no significant motivation to render herself 
fit to provide for the child. The Court further found 
that the child prospered in the current home and 
would likely suffer serious regression if returned to 
the natural mother and the termination order was 
entered. 
ISSUES PRESENTED 
1. DID THE LOWER COURT ERROR IN 
RELYING ON JUDICIAL ACTIONS WITHOUT 
PRESENTATION OF THE FACTS AND CIR-
CUMSTANCES UPON WHICH THESE ACTIONS 
WERE BASED AS A SUBSTANTIAL BASIS FOR 
HIS ORDER OF TERMINATION? 
2. IS THERE SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE ON 
THE RECORD TO SUPPORT THE FINDINGS OF 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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THE COURT WHICH FORMED THE BASIS OF 
THE TERMINATION ORDER? 
3. DID THE DIVISION OF FAMILY SERVICES 
FAIL TO COMPLY WITH THE ORDER OF THE 
COURT AND THE PURPOSES OF THE JUVENILE 
COURT ACT IN FAILING TO ASSIST THE AP-
PELLANT TO MEET THE REQUIREMENTS SET 
FORTH BY THE COURT SO THAT TERRY COULD 
BE RETURNED TO HIS MOTHER? 
ARGUMENT 
ISSUE NO. 1 
THE COURT BELOW COMMITTED 
REVERSIBLE ERROR IN RELYING ON THE 
RESULTS OF JUDICIAL ACTIONS WITHOUT 
PRESENTATION OF THE FACTS AND CIR-
CUMSTANCES UPON WHICH THESE ACTIONS 
WERE BASED AS A SUBSTANTIAL BASIS FOR 
HIS ORDER OF TERMINATION. 
In two leading Utah cases involving Juvenile 
Court proceedings on petitions to terminate parental 
rights, the Supreme Court has reviewed the ap-
propriateness of the Juvenile Court in considering 
matters which were not properly evidence before the 
Court and found such action as reversible error. In 
Fronk v. State 7 Utah 2d. 245, 322 P. 397 (1958), the 
Juvenile Court Judge took judicial notice of the fin-
dings of the District Court in a divorce action upon 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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which no evidence was introduced at the Juvenile Court 
hearing. In State v. Lance, 23 Utah 2d 407, 464 P. 2d 
395 (1970), the Juvenile Court Judge relied on a trial 
and conviction of the natural mother which occured 
after the Juvenile Court hearing and a social file, 
neither of which were properly introduced as 
evidence. 
At the time of the initial hearing on the petition to 
terminate the parental rights, Judge L. Roland An-
derson, Juvenile Court Judge, suggested he not hear 
the matter because of prior matters he had heard 
involving the appellant (p. 1), and upon the motion of 
appellant's attorney, withdrew as the Judge and 
transferred the matter to Judge Charles E. Bradford. 
At the beginning of the hearing before Judge Brad-
ford, Attorney Zollinger representing the State, 
moved the Court to consider testimony given at a 
hearing involving other children of appellant (p. 14). 
The Court correctly ruled that those records were not 
admissable because he wanted to know what the 
situation was at the present time and how it applied to 
the child in question. During the hearing, the same 
question was again raised and the Court ruled the 
prior conduct of appellant was too remote(p. 68). 
During the hearing, it was admitted by the appellant 
that custody in many of her children had been in-
voluntarily taken from her but there was absolutely no 
evidence on when, where, why and what this in-
voluntary change in custody involved. The Court, 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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without stating the specific facts upon which he made 
his findings, found the first three allegations "sub-
stantially" proven and stated on pages 315 and 316. 
uNow, by finding these first three true 
doesn't necessarily require that I terminate the 
parental rights. I think the facts of the 
allegations are basically shown. What I've been 
listening for, frankly, and what 1 had expected 
really to hear on Mrs. Gullett's part is some sort 
of evidence, some sort of showing that 
whatever the many difficiencies may have been 
resulted in having all of these other children 
taken away from her have been changed. 
There's been a material change in cir-
cumstances. So that we could have some 
resonable expectation that Terry's future 
would or his prospects would be brighter than 
the rest of the famlies." 
The Court further stated at page 321: 
"I realize that a person can change I even 
realize that a person can change late in life, but 
I don't see evidence of the kind of changes 
most recently in Mrs. Gullett's life that would 
indicate a real recognition that she needs to 
change or a willigness to set aside her own 
personal feelings and desires to make the 
sacrifice, to pay the price to do the extremely 
difficult job of being both mother and father to 
this little boy. To see that he gets the entire 
upbringing that her other children didn't have. 
Now, I don't, 1 haven't reviewed the eviden-
tuary record as far as the other children are 
concerned, but 1 am obliged to take judicial 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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notice of the Court's own records, I can only 
assume that the Court had just cause to remove 
the other children from the home, and there are 
some children that she has mentioned that she 
had given birth to that are not with her and 
their removal from the home has not been 
voluntary thing who were not mentioned in the 
Court's records. I don't know the cir-
cumstances and that to make my findings in 
respect to those other than what evidence is in 
the record and her testimony that they were 
removed other than a voluntary basis." 
After attorney for the appellant responded to the 
Court's order by pointing out from his personal 
recollection as her attorney of the substantial changes 
in the appellant's conduct since the last hearing (pp. 
322—324), the Court responded by acknowledging his 
lack of information on what had happened to cause the 
actions on which he was now basing his decision (p. 
324). 
The trial Court errored in basing his decision on 
assumptions without evidence to support those 
assumptions and upon court action that was not in-
troduced into evidence by any party during the 
hearing and the underlying facts were expressly ruled 
by the Court to be inadmissable during the hearing. 
ISSUE NO. 2 
THERE IS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE AS A 
MATTER OF LAW ON THE RECORD TO SUP-
PORT THE FINDINGS OF THE COURT ON THE 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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THREE ALLEGATIONS ACCEPTED AS TRUE 
THAT THE APPELLANT WAS AN UNFIT 
PARENT, THAT SUCH ALLEGATIONS WERE 
SERIOUSLY DETRIMENTAL TO THE CHILD, OR 
THAT APPELLANT COULD OR WOULD NOT 
CHANGE THESE DEFECTS CAUSING HER 
PARENTAL RIGHTS TO BE TERMINATED. 
The Court in the Lance case, stated the law 
and public policy consideration in termination of 
parental rights clearly as follows: 
"Deprivation of the parents' custody of 
their children is a drastic remedy which should 
be resorted to only in extreme cases and when 
it is manifest that the home itself cannot or will 
not correct the evils which exist. The cutting of 
family ties is a step of utmost gravity and is 
undesirable both socially and economically and 
should be avoided unless that is the only 
alternative to be found consistent with the best 
interests of the children. There is a presump-
tion that it is generally for the best interest and 
welfare of children to be reared under the care 
of their natural parents. Under this 
presumption the burden of persuading the trier 
of the fact is always on the person who claims 
that it will be for the best interests of the child 
to be reared by someone other than the natural 
parents of such child. To support a decision to 
deprive the parent of its child the Court must 
first be convinced of such fact by a prepon-
derance of the evidence. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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The juvenile Court did not specifically state the 
testimony or facts which proved to him that the State 
had proven the three allegations he accepted as true: 
but by careful review of the record, it is clear that no 
such evidence or its importance by a preponderous 
exists. 
ALLEGATION ONE: Appellant had not acquired 
the necessary skills to properly supervise and train 
the said child. The question of supervision was 
resolved in finding allegation four not true. All wit-
nesses who testified on the child's alleged defects in 
training were involved with the child after he had 
been removed from his mother and familiar 
surroundings. Those witnesses who dealt with the 
appellant and the child prior to the termination 
especially Mrs. McWhirter (p. 162-181) are clear that 
the appellant had trained and supervised the child. 
Mrs. McWhirter's position as a babysitter, 
licensed and paid by the Division of Family Services, 
who had Terry in her home every working day from 
Feburary 5, 1973 to April 27, 1973 except for a few 
days of sickness, is especially important. It should 
be noted that during this time to June 19, 1973, the 
Division of Family Services never contacted her about 
Terry's adjustment during the period, (p. 171). 
ALLEGATION TWO: Appellant's housekeeping 
standards were so poor as to seriously jeopardize the 
said child's physical and emotional health. Despite the 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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dispute of when some of the mess occurred (p. 91) the 
Court rendered the problem moot by not placing much 
emphasis on the problem (p. 316). 
Mr. Morgan from the Division of Family Services 
at the second hearing verified that the house was clean 
during his visits after the Court order (p. 380). 
ALLEGATION THREE: Apellant's moral 
standards are so low as to seriously damage the 
morals and welfare of the child. Even accepting all the 
adverse inferences against the appellant from the few 
facts on the record and not accepting her explanations, 
there is no evidence that this was a seriously 
damaging influence on the said child. She denied ever 
having sex even with her husband in front of the 
children. If a woman's belief that sexual relations 
with a man who is not her husband but with whom she 
is planning marriage shows a person is unfit to care for 
the child that may result therefrom, there would be 
many children removed from homes especially from 
young couples. The only witness on Mrs. Gullett's 
reputation admitted her bias due to her present 
husband's dating Mrs. Gullett between their divorce 
and subsequent remarriage (p. 294). 
Even accepting the allegations as true and that 
they substantially damage the child, there is no 
evidence on the record that the home cannot or will 
not correct the evils which exist as required in Lance. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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The record shows that the appellant and the minor 
child lived together from his birth until April 27, 1973. 
Mr. Morgan claimed at the second hearing that his 
agency had spent many hours with Mrs. Gullett but at 
the first hearing he admitted there wasn't much done 
with Mrs. Gullett in the last little while (p. 16). There 
is nothing in the record of what was done, by whom, 
and the appellant's response. This coupled with how 
the case began with a false report that the child had 
been abandoned and the babysitter had been forced to 
come to the home, the police under the direction of Mr. 
Morgan removed the child from the appellant's home. 
The child was never returned to Mrs. Gullett nor was 
she given any supportive assistance from the Division 
of Family Services as ordered by the Court. Still she, 
on her own, removed the other children from the 
home, cleaned up the house, changed her conduct, and 
even moved to Orem in an attempt to establish a new 
life and home so that Terry could be returned to her. 
She visited Terry every week and waited for Mr. 
Morgan to help her after she requested Terry be 
returned to her after the first hearing. This she was 
able to do despite the prejudice against her without 
any clear basis on the record as expressed by the 
Division of Family Services. Her problem of lack of 
schooling and intellect are overcome by her love for 
Terry and willingness to do what she is told to do. 
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ISSUE NO. 3 
Did the Division of Family Services fail to comply 
with the order of the Court and the purposes of the 
Juvenile Court Act in failing to assist and provide the 
appellant with the help and assistance to meet the 
requirements set forth by the Court so that Terry 
could be returned to his mother. 
Section 55—10—63, UCA(1953) as amended, state 
the purpose of the Juvenile Court Act: 
"It is the purpose of this act to secure for 
each child coming before the juvenile court 
such care, guidance, and control, preferably in 
his own home, as will serve his welfare and the 
best interests of the state; to preserve and 
strengthen family, ties whenever possible; to 
secure for any child who is removed from his 
home the care, guidance, and discipline 
required to assist him to develop into a 
responsible citizen to improve the conditions 
and home environment responsible for his 
delinquency; and, at the same time, to protect 
the community and its individual citizens 
against juvenile violence and juvenile law 
breaking. To this end this act shall be liberally 
construed." 
The Court recognizing these purposes made as 
part of the order that: 
"We'll request, in fact, we'll order, the 
Division of Family Services provide all ap-
propropriate support services that may be 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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indicated for Mrs. Gullett and give her every 
opportunity to learn good housekeeping 
practices, good parental practices, not to the 
extent of overriding her, but to provide what 
she might need to assist her in making the 
changes in her life that would be necessary for 
her to justify leaving Terry with her per-
manently." 
The final Court order was prepared by the Court 
and notice of its contents was given to the Division of 
Family Services by sending a copy of a letter sent to 
Bishop Maurice Welsh, Mrs. Gullett's LDS Bishop, 
(ex. A) Despite this, Mr. Morgan admitted that 
none of this was done, because of his pre—existing 
prejudices against the appellant. Mrs. Gullett was 
thus deprived the opportunity to acquire the skills and 
training that the Court believed she needed before 
allowing her to raise her son. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court in relying on the results of previous 
judicial actions without having the full facts in 
evidence before him and in the failure of the state to 
prove Mrs. Gullett's actions were so substantially 
harmful as to damage the child or to be incapable of 
correction and to prove assistance to allow her to 
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correct the alleged defects constitute reversible error 
and this Court should dismiss the said petition or, in 
the alternative, grant the appellant a new trial. 
Respectfully submitted, 
HILLYARD & GUNNELL 
Hillyard 
by for Appellant 
140 East Second North 
Logan, Utah 84321 
I hereby certify that I delivered copies of the 
foregoing brief of appellant to the Utah 
Attorney General's office this day of 
Oct. 1974. 
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